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States v. Briggs,

514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975).
The 1972 Republican Party National Convention was the scene of
various political demonstrations, acts of violence, and other disruptions.' Following an investigation of these disturbances, a federal
grand jury issued an indictment charging a conspiracy to violate various federal statutes. 2 Ten persons were named as conspirators; however, only seven were made defendants. The others were named as
"unindicted co-conspirators." 3 Prior to trial, tvo of the three unindicted coconspirators filed a petition in federal district court seeking
expungement of their names from the indictment. 4 The court denied
5
relief without opinion.
Upon appeal, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Briggs,6 held
that the appellants had standing to bring the action and that the
grand jury, in naming but not indicting the appellants, both "exceeded its powers and violated" the appellants' rights to due process.7
Accordingly, it vacated the district court's decision and remanded the
matter with directions that all references to the appellants in the indictment be expunged. 8
The threshold question in Briggs, as in many federal cases, was
whether the individual seeking to invoke the court's authority is a
proper party to do so, i.e., whether he has standing to sue. 9 The
I United

States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 796 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. Count One of the indictment charged conspiracy to violate certain federal laws
which in itself is a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970). Id. The indictment also charged
the commission of various substantive federal offenses. Brief for Appellee at 2, United
States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee].
3 United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 796 n.1, 797 (5th Cir. 1975). All but one of
the persons named "were active in the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, an anti-war
group." Id. at 805.
4 Id.
at 797.
5Id. The court indicated that the petition was denied on the ground that the appellants lacked standing to sue. Id. n.2.
6 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975).
7 Id. at 797, 806.
8 Id. at 808.
9See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). In Warth, the Supreme Court noted
that "[i]n essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the
court decide the merits of the dispute." Id. See also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See generally Lewis,
Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of "Standing", 14 STAN. L. REv. 433 (1962).
Standing, like the ripeness, mootness, political question, advisory opinion, and "case
2
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standing doctrine is based both on constitutional limitations to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts1 ° and on prudential considerations of
the proper situations in which a federal court should exercise its
law-declaring authority." In testing for standing, the emphasis is on
the party requesting relief rather than on the merits of the case. 12 To
overcome the constitutional limitations on jurisdiction, the party must
allege that he has suffered or will suffer "injury in fact.' 1 3 Beyond
or controversy" doctrines, is an element of the broader concept of justiciability. Justiciability involves a determination that an issue presented is a proper one to be decided by the courts. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). For a general
discussion of justiciability and its elements see 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3529-35 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT].
10 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-23 (1974); 13 WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 3531, at 176-77.
The constitutional basis for the standing doctrine is article III, section 2 of the Constitution of the United States, which limits the federal judicial branch to adjudicating "cases
or controversies." Warth v. Seldin, supra at 498; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-204 (1962); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 368, 386-91 (1803).
11 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500 (1975); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
12 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 423 (1969); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99
(1968). The focus upon the party is often discussed in terms of whether the party seeking standing has alleged a sufficient "personal stake in the outcome" to assure a proper
adversary proceeding. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See, e.g., Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-22 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, supra at
101.
The focus upon the party also seeks to ascertain the status he is asserting as a
litigant. Parties who assert their status as taxpayers, as in Flast v. Cohen, supra at 91-94,
or as citizens, as in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, supra at 213, will
be held to a higher standard than those persons who claim standing by means of a
statutory grant as in Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1970), and United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 684-85 (1973). In the statutory-grant cases, the issue
of standing-apart from the required allegation of injury in fact-appears to be one of
statutory construction. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1972); United States
v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, supra at 683-87.
The cases unanimously hold that a determination of standing does not involve the
merits of the case. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
supra at 153. However, in focusing on the party and his status, the nature of the action
must often be taken into consideration. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
In their textbook, Professors Hart and Wechsler query whether
clarity would be gained by viewing standing as involving problems of the nature and sufficiency of the litigant's concern with the subject matter of the litigation, as distinguished from problems of the justiciability-that is, the fitness
for adjudication-of the legal questions which he tenders for decisions.
H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 156
(2d ed. P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler 1973) [hereinafter cited as
HART & WECHSLER].
13 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). The article III "case or controversy"
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this constitutional requirement of injury in fact, "[g]eneralizations
about standing to sue are largely worthless as such.'14
Addressing the standing issue, the Briggs court first sought to
determine whether there had been a showing of injury in fact. 5 The
appellants argued that the grand jury's action damaged their reputations and impaired their employment opportunities. 16 Considering
these allegations, the court noted that the Supreme Court has many
times acted to protect the good names and reputations of individuals
and organizations. 1 7 For example, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,18
the Court held that a person's legally protected interest in her good
name was violated by publicly "posting" her name as an alcoholic. 1 9
Similarly, in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath 20
the Court acted to protect an organization from reputational damage
incurred as a consequence of its being designated as a communist
organization by the Attorney General of the United States. 2' In
addition, the Briggs court recognized that injury to economic interests
has been deemed worthy of protection on numerous occasions. 22
limitation is satisfied if the party can show that he "has suffered 'some threatened or
actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action.' " Id. (quoting from Linda R. S.
v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)). See also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218-19 (1974); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A
GENERAL VIEW 115 (1973); 13 WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 3531, at 197.
14Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
151 (1970). Some observations can, however, be made. When considering the prudential
limitations on its decision-making power, a federal court must balance delicate considerations of separation of powers and "the proper . . . role of the courts in a democratic
society." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). These considerations are least acute
when Congress has specifically provided for standing. See id. at 501; Association of
Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, supra at 154. See also Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 647-48
(1973). The most difficult questions arise when the party before the court is seeking
declaratory or injunctive relief against state or federal official action. HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 156-57.
15See 514 F.2d at 797-98.
16 Id.
1

7Id.
s 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
19Id. at 435-37. A state statute provided that persons who possessed certain "excessive drinking" characteristics could have their names posted and thereby be prevented
from buying intoxicating beverages. Id. at 434 & n.2. When a police chief posted Mrs.
Constantineau's name, forbidding the sale of liquors to her for one year, she brotight
suit seeking damages and injunctive relief. Id. at 435. The Supreme Court held that the
interest Mrs. Constantineau had in her "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity" required that procedural due process be afforded before she could be publicly stigmatized. Id. at 437.
20 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
21Id. at 124-25, 142. See also Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
22 514 F.2d at 798. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the Supreme
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Based upon these allegations of injury, the Briggs court determined that the standing requirements established by the Supreme
Court in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc.
v. Camp2 3 and Sierra Club v. Morton2 4 had been met by the appellants. 2 5 Both cases involved challenges to federal administrative
agency action by parties alleging standing, at least in part, on the
basis of a federal statute guaranteeing certain rights. 26 The test applied
in those cases required a claimant to demonstrate injury in fact and
to show that he "is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. "27
The conclusion reached by the Briggs court appears to be correct. Injury in fact was present and, furthermore, there does not appear to have been any reason for the court to exercise its discretionary powers to deny standing. 2 8 The standing cases ultimately relied
upon by the Briggs court, however, involved challenges to governmental action brought under a statute which specifically conferred
standing.2 9 Application of the standing criteria developed in these
cases to the factual circumstances of Briggs is inappropriate. 30 Those
Court found that direct economic injury, suffered as a result of a state's "Sunday Closing
Laws," was sufficient to afford standing to persons who challenged the laws as a violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment. Id. at 430-31. See also Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
23 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
24 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
25 514 F.2d at 799. The court also concluded that the issue was not a political question, was not moot, and that an opinion on the matter would not be advisory. Id. It also
rejected "as frivolous" the Government's argument that any harm suffered was at the
hands of the media, not the prosecution. Id. Finally, the court dismissed what it termed
the " 'innocence by association' " theory, i.e., that the appellants were exonerated by
the acquittal of the other defendants. Id.
26 405 U.S. at 730; 397 U.S. at 153-54. In both cases the petitioners claimed that
they had standing under section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
702 (1970), which provides for judicial review to persons who are aggrieved by governmental action "within the meaning of a relevant statute." See note 29 infra.
27 397 U.S. at 153; see 405 U.S. at 731-34.
28 This case did not involve one of those "abstract questions of wide public significance" that might be decided by other governmental branches or agencies. Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975). Furthermore, the relief sought-expungement of
the appellants' names from the indictment-did not raise a separation-of-powers question. See note 14 supra.
29 Both cases involved interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1970), which provides in part:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,
is entitled to judicial review thereof.
See 405 U.S. at 732-33; 397 U.S. at 156-57.
30 See Scott, supra note 14, at 647-48. Professor Scott feels that the presence or
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cases where parties have invoked the federal courts' jurisdiction absent any statutory provision would provide a firmer basis for a grant
of standing. 31 Two such decisions noted by the Briggs court involved
factual circumstances which, although distinguishable from those in
Briggs, are closely analogous.
For example, the allegation of improper designation in Joint
Anti-Fascist3 2 was found to be sufficient to support a grant of
standing. 33 Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, noted that
the activity that the organization sought to challenge was "governmental action stigmatizing them individually," and that "[tihe novelty
of the injuries" asserted should not prevent the Court from finding a
34
justiciable controversy.
More recently, in Jenkins v. McKeithen, 35 a labor union member
was afforded standing to challenge the procedures of a state commission which was created to investigate possible criminal violations in
the labor-management area. 36 The injury relied upon was the
commission's alleged plan to "brand" union members as criminals
"without trial or procedural safeguards, and to publicize
those
findings." 37 The Court found "that the personal and economic consequences" of such activity were sufficient to support a grant of
standing. 38 Both Joint Anti-Fascist and Jenkins involved allegations of
injury to names, reputations, and economic interests flowing from a
governmental designation made in the absence of procedural
absence of a statute granting standing is "[a] central distinction in the field of standing,
and one whose importance has not been sufficiently appreciated." Id. at 647. When
Congress has expressly granted standing to a given class of people, the separation of
powers issue-which normally arises when the judicial branch reviews an action of the
legislative branch-disappears, and only the article III requirement of actual "case or
controversy," i.e., injury in fact, remains. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975);
Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54
(1970). See also note 13 supra.
31 See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-25 (1969); Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 98-106 (1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-31 (1961); Tileston v.
Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 45-46 (1943).
32 See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
33 341 U.S. at 129, 140-41.
34 Id. at 159-60. Justice Frankfurter further noted that the "[diesignation works an
immediate substantial harm to the reputations of [the parties]"-a harm that, but for
"governmental immunity, would be clearly actionable at common law." Id.
3 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
36 Id. at 413-14.
37 Id. at 422-25.
38 Id. at 424-25. It should be noted, however, that the Court made it clear that it was
not faced "with a case in which any injury to appellant is merely a collateral consequence of the actions of an investigative body." Id. (citing Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S.
420, 443 (1960)).
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safeguards 39-precisely the allegations made in Briggs. Since both
decisions held such allegations sufficient for standing, the Briggs
court's finding of a justiciable controversy can be said to rest on a
40
sound precedential base.
Turning its attention from the challenge to its jurisdiction, the
Briggs court addressed the primary issue before it-the propriety of a
federal grand jury returning an indictment accusing persons of criminal conduct by naming them as coconspirators, yet not indicting
them.
The grand jury is an institution with strong constitutional and
historical roots. It was established in England as early as 1166 as a
body responsible for reporting to the Crown on crimes of which the
jury members were aware. 4 ' From its early role as an instrument of
the monarch, the grand jury evolved into a protective body which
acted to shield individuals from unfounded prosecution by refusing to
indict. 4 2 The colonists brought the institution of the grand jury with
them to America, 4 3 and the right to be free from prosecution for seri39Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 419, 422-25 (1969); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 158-61 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
4 To deny standing in this case would, in essence, be a decision upon the merits
since it would effectively preclude any person who is accused of a crime in an indictment but not indicted from challenging this type of grand jury action. Cf. Lewis, supra
note 9, at 435.
41 Kaufman, The Grand Jury-Its Role and Its Powers, 17 F.R.D. 331, 331-33
(1955); Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play?, 55 COLUM. L.
REV. 1103, 1106 (1955).

The Assize of Clarendon, issued in 1166 by Henry 1I, provided that officials of the
Crown should inquire of twelve men out of every 104 men in a township whether upon
their oath they knew of anyone in [le
.... ..
who.awa
...... 1o1r or th;f. 1
J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 185 (1883). For a survey
of the early use of the grand jury as an instrument for consolidating the Crown's power
see Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRIm. L.
REV. 701, 703-10 (1972).
42 In re Report & Recommendation of Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (D.D.C.
1974). The 1681 treason cases of The Trial of Stephen Colledge, at Oxford, for High
Treason, 8 How. St. Tr. 550 (1681), and Proceedings at the Old-Bailey, upon a Bill of
Indictment for High Treason, against Anthony Earl of Shaftesbury, 8 How. St. Tr. 759
(1681), marked the beginnings of the grand jury's shielding function. Kuh, supra note
41, at 1107-08. In both cases the grand jury returned the bill of indictment with "ignoramus" upon it, refusing to find a true bill. Id. at 1108. For a discussion of the Shaftesbury and Colledge trials see Schwartz, supra note 41, at 710-21.
43 Many of the colonies utilized the grand jury in their struggle with England.
Through it they could frustrate royal authority and prevent criminal prosecution. See R.
YOUNGER,

THE

PEOPLE'S

PANEL:

THE

GRAND

JURY

IN

THE

UNITED

STATES,

1634-1941, at 19-36 (1963) [hereinafter cited as YOUNGER]. The grand jury's image as a

protector against despotism was furthered by a colonial grand jury's refusal to indict
Peter Zenger for criminal libel after his newspaper attack on New York's English Governor. Kuh, supra note 41, at 1108-09.
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ous crimes without grand jury protection was incorporated into the
fifth amendment to the Constitution. 4
In addition to its shielding function, the grand jury also investigates and makes formal accusations. 4 5 When accusing, the grand jury
acts by means of indictment or presentment. 46 An indictment represents a grand jury's determination that there is probable cause to believe that charges put before it by the prosecutor are true, whereas a
presentment originates with the grand jury and is an accusation by
that body based upon the jurors' own knowledge or belief that a
47
crime has been committed.
A third form of accusation, the report, has often been utilized by
grand juries. 48 A report is a document issued by a grand jury which
charges wrongdoing or comments on affairs which fall short of actual
crimes. 49 Although the terms are often used synonymously, 50 a report
is technically quite different from a presentment since the object of a
presentment is to initiate a criminal prosecution or trial.51 The Briggs
44 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1956). The fifth amendment to
the Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
45 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-45 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 700-01 (1972); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 497, 499 (1960) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
46 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1956); United States v. Cox, 342
F.2d 167, 187-89 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., concurring), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
" United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 187-88 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 437
(1959). The presentment as it was known at common law is now considered obsolete
since federal grand juries are always assisted by prosecutors who themselves can bring
indictments. Application of United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858,
863 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); 1 WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 110, at 197 & n.87 (1969).
4' See In re Report & Recommendation of Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219, 1222
(D. D.C. 1974); Dession & Cohen, InquisitorialFunctions of GrandJuries, 41 YALE L.J.
687, 705-06 (1932); notes 54-57 infra and accompanying text.
49 In re Report of Grand Jury Proceedings, 479 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir. 1973); In re
Report & Recommendation of Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219, 1223-24 (D.D.C. 1974).
50 See, e.g., In re Presentment of Grand Jury, 315 F. Supp. 662, 675 (D. \Id 1970);
In re Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 34, 89 A.2d 416, 423 (1952). See also
Note, The Grand Jury as ani Investigator, Body, 74 HARV. L. REV. 590, 592 n.16 (1961).
51 United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 189 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 295 (N.D. Cal.
1952); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *298-99.

This distinction becomes most important when a grand jury attempts to initiate
criminal proceedings against an individual and the prosecutor refuses to sign the presentment and thus convert it to an active indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342
F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); In re Presentment of Special
Grand Jury, 315 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1970). The requirement that a grand jury presentment be signed by the prosecutor before a person can be forced to answer criminal

19761

NOTES

court could find no support other than custom for the Government's
contention that federal grand juries could use an indictment to charge
52
private individuals with a crime and yet not make them defendants.
However, since the court's conclusions regarding indictments were
consistent with "the body of law concerning reports by federal grand
juries," the court explored the "outer limits" of the grand jury's rep5
ortorial power.
One of the major functions of the English grand jury was to re-

port to the Crown on all issues of public concern within its
jurisdiction, 54 and this practice was continued by colonial grand juries
which often issued sweeping reports on public affairs. 55 There is,
charges is the corollary of the requirement that a grand jury must agree with the prosecutor before an indictment can issue. This requirement of concurrence guarantees that
no one may be forced to answer to infamous federal crimes without the agreement of
both prosecutor and grand jury. See United States v. Cox, supra, 342 F.2d at 190 (Wisdom, J., concurring).
52 The Briggs court rejected the argument of "custom" as being a sound basis for
finding such action by a grand jury proper and noted that a similar argument was struck
down in Application of United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 869
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). 514 F.2d at 801.
-1 514 F.2d at 801-03. The court noted that none of the functions of an indictment
were served by naming, but not indicting, the appellants. Id. at 803. The purposes of the
indictment are to provide (1) adequate notice to the defendant so that he can prepare
his defense, (2) sufficient information so that a person who is tried will not be subjected
to double jeopardy, and (3) adequate information to the court so that it can determine if
the facts alleged "are sufficient in law to support a conviction." United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1876).
5 10 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 146-51 (1938); Kuh, supra
note 41, at 1106-10. See In re Presentment of Special Grand Jury, 315 F. Supp. 662,
675 (D. Md. 1970); In re Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 40-41, 89 A.2d 416,
426-27 (1952).
55
In re Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 41-44, 89 A.2d 416, 426-28 (1952).
The reports issued by colonial grand juries ranged from charges of neglect of duty in
local government, id., to complaints against ministers who failed to check up on persons who had missed church, YOUNGER, supra note 43, at 11. For a general discussion
of the grand jury's reporting role in colonial society see id.at 5-4 1.
Many states still provide for grand jury reports by statute. Such reports are usually
limited to public officials and must be accompanied b suLfficient procedural safeguards
such as notice to persons who are named in the report and an opportunity to challenge
its contents insofar as it concerns them. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 200 (1959); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 905.28 (Supp. 1975-76); N.Y. CRI-\i. PRo. LANV § 190.85 (McKinney 1971).
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3333 (1970), provides for reports
by special grand juries. The scope of these reports and the procedural safeguards that
must accompany their issuance are very similar to the restrictions of the New York
statute. Conupare 18 U.S.C. § 3333 (1970) with N.Y. CRI.\i. PRO. LAw § 190.85 (McKinney 1971).
The New Jersey court rules, N.J.R. 3:6-9, provide for procedural safeguards governing the issuance of a grand jury presentment, which is the term used in New Jersey to
describe reports. See in re Presentment of Essex County Grand Jury, 46 N.J. 467,
471-72, 475, 217 A.2d 874, 876, 878 (1966).
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however, some question as to whether federal grand juries enjoy the
same common law reportorial power as their state counterparts. 56 The
Briggs court, recognizing this point, stated that the authorities were
in disagreement as to "whether a federal grand jury has authority to
issue a report of any kind." 57 This statement is somewhat overbroad
since the cases discussing federal grand juries have clearly recognized
a limited reportorial power.
For example, in Application of United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, 5 8 the court expunged a "presentment" 59
which did not seek an indictment but rather accused union leaders of
violations of federal laws and indicated that the grand jury had considered charges of perjury and conspiracy against them. 6 0 The court held
that the grand jury did not have the power "to make accusations
against individuals falling short of indictment." 6 1 It noted, however,
that reports "of a general nature" were not at issue and suggested
that such reports would be permissible.62
Similarly, in United States v. Cox, 63 the Fifth Circuit, in a split
decision, reversed a contempt charge against a United States Attorney who had refused to draft or sign a presentment for a grand
jury. 64 In so doing, the court indicated that grand jury powers are
56 See Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 992, 994 (No. 18,255) (C.C.D. Cal. 1872);
Kuh, supra note 41, at 1123-24.
57 514 F.2d at 801 (emphasis in original).
58 111 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
59 Although the grand jury called its document a presentment, the court treated it as
a report since it did not accuse persons with the intent that they should be indicted. Id.
at 863. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
60 111 F. Supp. at 860. The grand jury had investigated possible violations of conspiracy and perjury laws with respect to noncommunist affidavits filed by union officials
pursuant to national labor laws. Id. The presentment was issued when union officials
who had been subpoenaed invoked their privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
In addition to the accusations, the grand jury recommended that the unions have
their certifications revoked by the National Labor Relations Board. Id. The presentment
did not actually name the officials but referred to them as " 'responsible officers.' " Id.
61
Id. at 864-66. The court stated that since the grand jury is an arm of the judicial
branch, it could not issue advisory opinions. Id. at 864. By recommending that the
NLRB revoke the unions' certifications, the grand jury assumed an advisory role and,
accordingly, violated the doctrine of separation of powers. Id. at 860, 865. The court also
stated that the presentment had violated the grand jury's secrecy requirement since it
used evidence that it collected in its official capacity. Id. at 866. Furthermore, since it
was still investigating the matter, the adverse information of the report might prejudice
a person's right to a fair trial should an indictment be forthcoming. Id. at 869.
62 Id. at 869. The court was careful to note that its holding did not include general
reports "touching on conditions in the community." Id. Such reports "may serve a valuable function and may not be amenable to challenge." Id.
63 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
6 342 F.2d at 172.
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limited solely to determining probable cause. 65 In a concurring opinion, Judge Wisdom explored the grand jury's powers of presentment
and concluded that although the prosecutor could not be forced to
sign and thereby validate the presentment, the grand jury could
"present either findings and a report or an accusation in open court
by presentment.- 66 This result, he argued, would be consistent both
with the grand jury's traditional power to report and with its role as a
67
shield against improper prosecution.
Recent cases have firmly upheld the federal grand jury's reportorial power. In Application of Johnson,68 the Seventh Circuit refused
to expunge a report referring to the Black Panther Party in connection with possession of weapons for violent purposes. 69 The court,
apparently assuming the existence of a reportorial power, indicated
that only those reports which charged individuals with illegal activity
65 Id. at 171. In another grand jury case, eight years later, the Fifth Circuit took a
more expansive view toward grand jury powers, stating that
there is persuasive authority and considerable historical data to support a holding that federal grand juries have authority to issue reports which do not indict
for crime, in addition to their authority to indict and to return a no true bill.
In re Report of Grand Jury Proceedings, 479 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir. 1973) (footnote
omitted).
66 342 F.2d at 189. A similar situation faced the court in In re Presentment of Special
Grand Jury, 315 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1970). On orders from the Department of Justice,
the United States Attorney refused to sign a grand jury presentment. Id. at 668. The
court agreed with the Cox court's finding that the prosecutor could not be forced to sign
the presentment. It noted, however, that the grand jury enjoyed the common law power
to issue reports "calling attention to certain actions of public officials, whether or not
they amounted to a crime." Id. at 675. After balancing the interests, it released in exhibit
form "the substance of the charges" made in the presentment. The court excluded those
portions of the report where the possible harm to the individual named outweighed the
public's right to know. Id. at 678-79. Important to the court's decision was the fact that
the report dealt with the "public business" and exculpated certain officials whose innocence had been questioned by the press. See id. at 678.
67 342 F.2d at 189-90. According to Judge Wisdom, a primary function of the grand
jury-that of shielding individuals from prosecution-would be fully served by the
United States Attorney's refusal to sign the presentment thus preventing it from becoming an instrument of prosecution. Such inaction would convert the presentment
into the familiar inquisition of office "employed for centuries to designate the
findings of a grand jury with respect to derelictions in matters of public concern, particularly of officials, which may fall short of being criminal offenses."
Id. at 189 (footnote omitted) (quoting from In re Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23,
35, 89 A.2d 416, 423 (1952)). This use of the presentment, Judge Wisdom noted, "would
be in accord with the established procedure in the common law and with the original
understanding of the framers." 342 F.2d at 189.
68 484 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1973).
69 Id. at 797. The 250-page report was issued when the grand jury failed to find
probable cause to indict but wished to criticize the activities of the Chicago Police
Department during a raid on the Black Panther Party Headquarters, resulting in the
death of two party members. Id. n.8; see N.Y. Times, May 16, 1970, at 1, col. 8.
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or accompanied indictments should be suppressed.°70 In a case dealing
with the "Watergate" grand jury, In re Report & Recommendation of
Grand Jury, 71 Judge Sirica specifically considered whether federal
grand juries have the power to issue reports. 72 He concluded that a
grand jury does have the power to issue a report consisting of "a
simple and straightforward compilation of information gathered by the
73
Grand Jury."
It seems clear, therefore, that federal grand juries do possess the
power to issue reports. 7 4 The scope of this reportorial power is, however, severely limited, due both to a lack of statutory base 75 and to
70 484 F.2d at 797. The court thus distinguished Application of United Elec., Radio
& Mach. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), and Hammond v. Brown, 323 F.
Supp. 326 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 450 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1971), noting that in the Johnson
case, the grand jury had authority to make the report and that no prejudice would result
to any of the party members since they were not accused by name, charged with illegal
acts, or indicted. 484 F.2d at 797. For a discussion of the Hammond case see note 74

infra.
71

370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974).

72

Id. at 1221.

Id. at 1226. In so ruling, the court emphasized that the report at issue made no
accusations, "deprive[d] no one of an official forum in which to respond," was not used
in lieu of an indictment when an indictment could issue, and did not offend the concept
of separation of powers. Id. The court also addressed the question of whether the report
should be disclosed-as the grand jury had requested-to the congressional committee
handling the Watergate impeachment inquiry. Id. at 1227. After balancing the interests
involved, the court concluded that disclosure was proper and that, given the circumstances, public disclosure might even be justified. Id. at 1230.
74 Despite the recognition of reportorial power in the cases, there exists authority
for an opposite view. Chief among this category is Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp.
326 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 450 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1971). In Hammond, the court expunged
portions of a report of an Ohio grand jury which had investigated the shooting of student
protesters at Kent State University in 1970. 323 F. Supp. at 330, 358. Although applying
Ohio law, the court spoke in broad terms, indicating that grand juries have no authority
to issue any type of reports. Id. at 345.
Hammond can be distinguished on several grounds. First, the court was applying
Ohio-not federal-law. Id. at 346. Second, indictments had been returned with the
report, and the court noted that in so doing the jury had, in effect, tried the defendants
in advance. To allow the report to stand would interfere with the defendants' right to a
fair trial. Id. at 341-43. Third, in reference to the unindicted and unnamed faculty
members criticized in the report, the court found that the existence of the report violated
the first amendment by impinging upon and chilling academic freedom and free expression, a situation which seems limited to state teachers. Id. at 348-50. Finally, it should
be noted that the Hammond court also inexplicably quoted Application of United Elec.,
Radio & Mach. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), for the proposition that
general reports " 'touching on conditions in the community' " may not be subject to
challenge. 323 F. Supp. at 346.
Other sources have also indicated that federal grand juries have no power to issue
reports. See, e.g., ABA FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK 11 (1959); 1 WRIGHT, supra
note 9, § 110, at 198 (1969); Orfield, supra note 47, at 446-47.
75 Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 992, 994 (No. 18,255) (C.C.D. Cal. 1872); Kuh,
supra note 41, at 1123; Comment, The Grand Jury: Powers, Procedures, and Problems, 9
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 681, 690-94 (1973).
73
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the nature of federal grand juries. 76 As the Briggs court noted, the
courts have been hostile to reports which "accuse persons of crime
Neither the Constitution nor statutes delineate the power and functions of the federal grand jury. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure deal with the grand jury in a
general fashion; they do not attempt to establish the scope of the grand jury's powers.
See FED. R. CRaM. P. 6, 7. But see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-34 (1970), which provides for
special federal grand juries and reportorial authority. See also 4 STAN. L. REV. 68 (1951),
discussing a 1951 bill proposed by Senator Richard Nixon which would have defined
the role of the grand jury.
This situation differs from that in the states, which often clearly define the purpose
and scope of the grand jury, including its reportorial power, if any. See note 55 supra.
76 Although "[t]here is every reason to believe that our constitutional grand jury was
intended to operate substantially like its English progenitor," Costello v. United States,
350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956); see In re Kittle, 180 F. 946, 947 (2d Cir. 1910), and although
English grand juries most certainly issued sweeping reports, see, e.g., Kuh, supra note
41, at 1109-10, there remain valid reasons to conclude that federal-as opposed to state
-grand juries do not enjoy such broad power.
It is clear that the fifth amendment provisions requiring indictment or presentment
before prosecution were inserted primarily to interpose the grand jury as a shield between the citizen and the new federal government, and considerations of the grand
jury's accusatory and investigatory roles were purely ancillary to this important shielding function. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887); L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT 415-16 (1968); YOUNGER, supra note 43, at 45-47; Remarks of Abraham

Holmes,

Massachusetts

Ratifying

Convention

Debates,

Jan.

30, 1788, in 2 B.
692 (1971). To this extent, the role of the federal grand jury may differ from that of its state counterparts
which evolved from the English grand juries which traditionally served the multiple
functions of accusation, investigation, and protection. See note 43 supra. It is therefore
reasonable to assume that, by employing the term "presentment" in the fifth amendment, the Framers did not intend to grant to the grand jury a reportorial power, but
rather intended the word in its technical form, i.e., simply empowering the grand jury,
on its own information, to present an individual for indictment. See Charge to Grand
Jury, 30 F. Cas. 992. 994 (No. 18.255) (C.C.D. Cal. 1872), wherein Justice Field argued
that federal grand juries, in at least some respects, lack the power of state grand juries.
Other factors argue against broad federal grand jury reportorial power. Crimes
against the federal government are purely statutory, Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S.
236, 241 (1943); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1943), and the grand
jury's powers are limited by the court's jurisdiction, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 55
(1906); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 790-91 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
Therefore, inquiries into possible crime should be more specifically focused than in
state grand juries. YOUNGER, supra note 43, at 46-47. It has even been suggested that
the "case and controversy" requirement places a constitutional restriction on the grand
jury's power to issue reports, the absence of probable cause to indict ousting the federal
court from jurisdiction. Application of United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 111 F.
Supp. 858, 864-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
Furthermore, it has been argued that the federal grand jury is too far removed from
the operation of the national government to perform the traditional grand jury function
of reporting on the misdoings of local government and public officials. Charge to Grand
Jury, 30 F. Cas. 992, 994 (No. 18,255) (C.C.D. Cal. 1872); YOUNGER, supra note 43,
at 47.
Finally, it should be noted that federal grand jury reports are not subject to the
statutory safeguards that usually accompany a legislative grant of reportorial power. See
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3333 (1970); statutes cited note 55
su pra.
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
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while -affording them no forum in which to vindicate themselves." 77
They have expressed similar disfavor with reports which are con79
78
cerned with nonfederal subjects or stray from the public business.
Consequently, it seems safe to conclude that the federal grand jury
is limited to reports which simply compile information or comment
80
on the federal public business.
77 514 F.2d at 802. It is rare for a grand jury to actually charge a person with a crime
in a report and still deprive him of a forum in which to respond. For example, in Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 450 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1971), the
parties accused of crime in the report were also indicted. 323 F. Supp. at 340-42. The
United Electrical Workers case appears to come as close as grand juries venture to actually charging a specific person with a crime and yet not indicting him. In that case, the
union leaders who were the subject of an accusatory report were not specifically named;
however, they were easily identifiable. Application of United Elec., Radio & Mach.
Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 860-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
Reports have also been attacked as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. This criticism is based upon two distinct arguments: (1) Since the grand jury is
considered an appendage of the court, reports, which often are critical of legislative or
executive practices, are improper, Application of United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers,
supra at 863-65; and (2) the report intrudes upon legislative prerogatives by condemning activity which the legislature has not sought to make criminal, Comment, The
Grand Jury: Powers, Procedures, and Problems, 9 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 681, 692
& n.65 (1973).
Finally, reports have been severely criticized as violating the grand jury's duty of
maintaining secret proceedings. Application of United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers,
supra at 865-66. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), which provides for grand jury secrecy.
78 See, e.g., In re Report of Grand Jury Proceedings, 479 F.2d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 1973);
In re Report of the Grand Jury, 4 U.S. Dist. Hawaii 780, 789 (1911).
79 The cases recognize a distinction between private activity and the public business. See, e.g., In re Report of Grand Jury Proceedings, 479 F.2d 458, 460 n.2 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 189 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); In re Presentment of Special Grand Jury, 315 F. Supp. 662,
675 (D. Md. 1970); In re Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 35, 89 A.2d 416, 423
(1952).
The grand jury's historical function as an inquisitorial body which could report on
community business and delve into official corruption is so basic to the concept of the
grand jury that authority to report on the public business must be considered part of its
common law power. See In re Report of Grand Jury Proceedings, 479 F.2d 458, 460 n.2
(5th Cir. 1973); Application of United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858,
869 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Kuh, supra note 41, at 1124. But see Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F.
Cas. 992, 994 (No. 18,255) (C.C.D. Cal. 1872).
80 See In re Report & Recommendation of Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219, 1226
(D.D.C. 1974).
The grand jury report has been attacked as objectionable on several grounds. It has
been urged that the report is too prejudicial, since any utterance from a grand jury is
likely to be afforded a high degree of credibility by the public, making it virtually impossible for the subject of the report to clear his name. Application of United Elec.,
Radio & Mach. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Comment, Legality of
the Grand Jury Report, 52 MICH. L. REV. 711, 717 (1954). Furthermore, it has been
suggested that the political unaccountability of grand juries, coupled with the lack of
any legal standards by which to determine when a report should issue, creates too great
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The validity of the Briggs court's analogy to grand jury reports is
apparent. Both the report and the unindicted coconspirator designation accuse without offering a forum in which to defend. 8 ' It is clear
that a report accusing the appellants of conspiracy would not pass
judicial muster. 82 Recognizing this, the Briggs court could find "no
persuasive reason why the federal grand jury should be permitted to
do by indictment what it could not do" by report. 83 Furthermore, the
court urged that the grand jury's action amounted to "exactly the reverse" of its primary function of providing a shield against unwarranted charges of crime. If there was no probable cause to indict the
appellants, the court concluded, then they should not have been
publicly branded. 84
Having concluded that the grand jury is without authority to accuse persons except when it indicts them, the Briggs court next considered the constitutional restraints on grand juries.8 5 Since "the
a danger of unfairness. Id. at 718-19; see Application of United Elec., Radio & Mach.
Workers, supra at 865. Additionally, it is urged that the grand jury, with its lack of
professional expertise and with limited funds, is ill-equipped to carry on the thorough
investigation necessary for the presentation of an objective report. Comment, supra at
720.
81 Commentators have noted the similarity between the grand jury report and the
unindicted coconspirator designation but have reached opposite conclusions as to the
significance of that comparison. Compare Boudin, The Federal GrandJury, 61 GEO. L.J.
1, 19 (1972) and Comment, supra note 77, at 693 n.66, with Kuh, supra note 41, at
1121-22.
82 The Fifth Circuit has suggested that the important considerations in evaluating
the propriety of any report are
whether the report describes general community conditions or whether it refers
to identifiable individuals; whether the individuals are mentioned in public or
private capacities; the public interest in the contents of the report balanced
against the harm to the individuals named; the availabilty and efficacy of remedies; whether the conduct described is indictable.
In re Report of Grand Jury Proceedings, 479 F.2d 458, 460 n.2 (5th Cir. 1973). A similar
test for evaluating the permissible scope of reports would consider at whom the report
is aimed, when the circumstances warrant a report, and what may be contained therein.
Kuh, supra note 41, at 1122-31.
Under both schemes, the primary factors to be considered seem to be the extent of
the accusation, whether it deals with the public business, and whether it is general or
specific. The unindicted coconspirator designation presented in Briggs fails all of these
tests. It was accusatory to the point of charging actual crime, and it specifically named
the individuals charged. Finally, those accused were not public officials and were not
carrying on public business.
83 514 F.2d at 802. The court noted that accusation through indictment was even
more objectionable than by report because of the public's familiarity with indictments.
id.
84 Id. at 803. The court indicated that the grand jury's action was the result of misdirection by the prosecutor. Id.
85Id. at 804-06.
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grand jury merely investigates and reports [but] does not try," 86 and
because of the disruptive effect that a full application of procedural
due process might have upon its investigation, 87 the grand jury is not
required to provide those appearing before it with the full panoply of
procedural safeguards. 8 8 The court recognized that the limited procedural safeguards that are afforded in grand jury proceedings were
merely reflective of the principle that due process requirements vary
depending upon the interests involved. 89 This traditional application
requires that the interests of the Government be weighed against
those of the individual in order to determine whether the due process
afforded under the circumstances was sufficient. 90
The court commenced this balancing test by noting the harm
caused to persons who are named as unindicted coconspirators.

91

It

then attempted to discover possible countervailing governmental interests in accusing persons of criminal conduct yet affording them no
forum in which to respond. 92 It found that the Government had offered nothing rising "to the dignity of a substantial interest," and rejected, as conclusory, the suggestion that the naming was required in
'the interest of justice.' "93

The court acknowledged that there was "at least an implication
that" the naming of the appellants was necessary to prove, or to aid
in proving, the conspiracy. 94 The Government did not, however,
86 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 449 (1960).
87

Id.

See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-50 (1974); Costello v. United

States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
88 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 430 (1969). This absence of procedural safeguards has been noted by Justice Douglas:
An indictment returned by a grand jury may not be challenged because it rests
wholly on hearsay. An accused is not entitled to a hearing before a grand jury,
nor to present evidence, nor to be represented by counsel; and a grand jury
may act secretly-a procedure normally abhorrent to due process.
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 499 (1960) (dissenting opinion) (citation omitted). But
see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974) (describing limitations on the
grand jury's investigatorial power).
89 514 F.2d at 804.
90Id. Accord, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1970); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
91514 F.2d at 804.
92

Id.

93 Id.

The Government, relying upon three state court cases, argued that a grand
jury's failure to name persons has, in the past, resulted in an invalid indictment. Brief for
Appellee, supra note 2, at 24. However, these cases-Wilson v. State, 204 Miss. 111,
115, 37 So. 2d 19, 20 (1948); State v. Klasner, 19 N.M. 474, 478, 145 P. 679, 680 (1914);
and McCloy v. State, 47 Tex. Crim. 124, 125-26, 80 S.W. 524, 524-25 (1904)-all involved situations where the naming of the victims of the crimes was necessary for the
defendant's protection against later jeopardy.
94 514 F.2d at 804-05.
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explain how such a naming might aid in the proof of its case. The
court therefore speculated that the Government might mean that it
utilized the unindicted coconspirators tactic to attribute to the defendants the acts of as many persons as possible and thereby to improve
the probability of a conviction. 95 This goal, the court pointed out,
could be attained simply by introducing evidence at trial, and did not
justify the naming of individuals as conspirators. 9 6 Furthermore, if
the Government wanted the indictment to focus upon a specific individual, it could do so by naming him as a "John Doe," with a subsequent unmasking in a bill of particulars or at trial. 9 7 The court recognized that such an unmasking might still injure the party named, but
noted that the public impact of such a naming could arguably be
mitigated by court orders and that an accusation by the prosecutor
alone would not carry the credibility of an indictment.9 8 The court
also rejected, on the grounds that less injurious methods were available, the possibility that an individual might validly be named in the
indictment to elicit his testimony and thereby aid the Government's

95 Id. at 805. A person who is involved in a criminal conspiracy is liable for the substantive crimes of his coconspirators if the offense was "in furtherance of the conspiracy" and was reasonably foreseeable. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1946). See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW

§

65, at 513-22

(1972).
96 514 F.2d at 805. The court relied upon Clune v. United States, 159 U.S. 590
(1895), and Heflin v. United States, 132 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1943), in support of the
proposition that persons need not be named in an indictment in order to attribute the
acts of the defendants to them. 514 F.2d at 805 n.17.
97 514 F.2d at 805. A bill of particulars is a document whereby a defendant in a
criminal action might obtain additional information concerning the charges against him.
United States v. Smith, 16 F.R.D. 372, 375 (W.D. Mo. 1954). Its purpose is to provide
information necessary to the preparation of a party's defense and to avoid prejudicial
surprise at trial. United States v. Bearden, 423 F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 836 (1970). Rule 7(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically provides for use of a bill of particulars.
98 514 F.2d at 805. The naming in an indictment was said to have more impact since
it was the official action of a quasi-judicial body with significant "historical status and
power," as compared with the testimony of a witness at trial who acts "as a private individual and makes no formal adjudication." Id.
The court also stated that, in applying a due process test, "wholly different, and
valid, governmental interests apply to" identifying an individual in a bill of particulars
or at trial than apply to naming him as an unindieted coconspirator. Id. It did not, however, identify these "different interests," and it is likely that the court did not mean
that the governmental interest would change, since the Government's interest-a successful prosecution-remains the same. Instead, the court's focus appears to be on the
Government's intent. A naming in a bill of particulars or during trial testimony would
apparently convince the court that the intent was to pursue valid interests and the
naming was simply a necessary adjunct to obtaining a conviction, not an attempt to
"brand" those named.
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case. 99 Finally, the court expressed its "strong suspicion" that the
Government's purpose in naming the appellants was to stigmatize
them as part of "an overall governmental tactic directed against disfavored persons and groups."' 10 0 This purpose was condemned as an
attempt to impose "extra-judicial punishment."' 0 '
Finding no valid governmental interest, the court concluded that
so long as a grand jury remains within the scope of its traditional
powers of indicting, investigating, and possibly rendering "limited
types of reports," the court would continue to apply the minimal due
process standards traditionally associated with grand jury action. 102
When, however, the grand jury steps out of its "historically authorized role," as it did here, a conventional due process test would
be applied. Thus, the Government must show that its action was
compelled by a substantial interest 10 3 which outweighed the injury
suffered by the appellants.' 0 4 Since the Government had provided no
99 Id. This statement was apparently intended to reflect the fact that only courts,
through the exercise of a contempt citation, should impose a sanction upon a recalcitrant
witness. An uncooperative witness may be cited for contempt and imprisoned until he
testifies. The period of confinement is limited to the term of either the court proceeding
or the grand jury, but no imprisonment is to exceed eighteen months. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1826(a) (1970). Both appellants in Briggs had been cited for contempt and imprisoned
under this statute for refusing to testify before the grand jury even though they had
been granted immunity. 514 F.2d at 804 n.16.
100 514 F.2d at 805-06. The court took cognizance of the fact that the practice of
naming persons as unindicted coconspirators was "not an isolated occurrence in time
or context," and that the Government had utilized the practice in other cases with political overtones. Id. at 805.
101 Id. at 806. The court further noted that if the naming were to chill the appellants' first amendment rights, it would have been equally unacceptable. Id.
102

Id.

103Id. at 804-06. The Supreme Court has used the term "substantial interest," as

well as other terms, to describe the quality of a governmental interest which it felt to be
sufficiently important such that regulation concerning such an interest may infringe
upon personal liberties but still be justified. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
376-77 (1968). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-66
(1958). In determining whether the governmental action is justified, the following factors must be taken into consideration:
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
United States v. O'Brien, supra at 377.
104 514 F.2d at 806. The court made it clear that it was not passing on "[t]he extent
to which the grand jury could be constitutionally authorized to act beyond the powers"
it presently enjoys by virture of common law or statute. Id. It indicated that the due
process balance might differ if the power to name persons as undicted coconspirators
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substantial interest to support its treatment of the appellants, the
Briggs court held that the grand jury had both "exceeded its powers
05
and violated due process as well."'
The court next considered its power to grant the expungement
remedy sought by the appellants. 10 6 The historic rule, enunciated in
Ex parte Bain,'10 7 is that courts are powerless to amend the body of
an indictment.' 0 8 The Bain rule has, however, been considerably relaxed, and amendments to an indictment are now permissible if the
underlying rationale of the rule is not frustrated.' 0 9
The Bain rule seeks to serve two purposes: to preserve the fifth
amendment guarantee that a person be tried for a serious offense only
on an indictment by a grand jury, 110 and to ensure that the functions
of the indictment-sufficiently apprising the defendant of the nature
of the charges against him and preventing a trial on the same charge
-after acquittal-are maintained. 11 1 The reluctance of the courts to
modify an indictment stems from the fear that such a modification
would infringe upon these safeguards and thus have a prejudicial
effect." 2 Any amendment which alters or broadens the charge against
a defendant, and thereby acts to his prejudice, is considered a subwere conferred by statute and referred in a footnote to the procedural provisions of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3333 (1970). 514 F.2d at 806 & n.20.
For a general discussion of the report provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970 see Note, Grand Jury-Reports Not Amounting to Presentments, 18 WAYNE L.
REV. 1643 (1972).
105 514 F.2d at 806 (footnote omitted).
106 Id. at 806-07.
107 121 U.S. 1 (1887).
101Id. at 8.

i0See, e.g., Russell v. United S s, 3..
9 U.S. 740 , 763, 770 (1962); Stiron v.
United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215-17 (1960); United States v. Dawson, 516 F.2d 796, 801
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 104 (1975); Thomas v. United States, 398 F.2d 531,
536-40 (5th Cir. 1967).
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure reflect this flexibility and allow the court,
in its discretion, to strike prejudicial or irrelevant material from an indictment. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 7(d). Some courts, however, maintain that rule 7(d) is properly applicable
only when the indictment contains nonessential matters which could prejudice the defendant. Dranow v. United States, 307 F.2d 545, 558 (8th Cir. 1962). See also United
States v. Kemper, 503 F.2d 327, 329 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975);
Carroll v. United States, 326 F.2d 72, 82 (9th Cir. 1963).
110 121 U.S. at 12-13. See also Russell v. United States, 369 U.S 749, 770-71 (1962);
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 216 (1960); United States v. Skelley, 501 F.2d
447, 453 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1051 (1974).
"I See, e.g., Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962); Bartell v. United
States, 227 U.S. 427, 431 (1913). See also note 53 supra.
ii2 See, e.g., United States v. Dawson, 516 F.2d 796, 800-04 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 104 (1975); Stewart v. United States, 395 F.2d 484, 487-89 (8th Cir. 1968);
Williams v. United States, 179 F.2d 656, 659-60 (5th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 97
(1951).
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stantive change and can only be made by a grand jury.11 3 A nonprejudicial modification is considered to be merely a change of form, and
1 14
it is within the court's discretion to make such a modification.
The Briggs court ignored this traditional approach in determining
that it could expunge the appellants' names from the indictment. Instead it relied upon its earlier analogy to grand jury reports." 5 Since
accusatory reports are unauthorized, and therefore subject to expungement, 116 the court reasoned that such a remedy was appropriate in this case. 11 7 It relied upon Application of American Society
for Testing and Materials118 (ASTM) in support of the premise that
courts have the power to defend unindicted coconspirators." 9
In ASTM, a nonprofit trade society that had been named as an
unindicted coconspirator in an antitrust action sought to have references to it expunged from the indictment. 120 The court found the
society free from wrongdoing and ordered that a reference to its opinion exonerating the society be attached to that portion of the indictment that charged the society with conspiracy. 12 1 The court did not,
22
however, grant the remedy of expungement.1
113 Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962); Stirone v. United States, 361
U.S. 212, 215-16 (1960); United States v. Denny, 165 F.2d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 844 (1948). This is true even though the defendant consents to the
amendment. Heisler v. United States, 394 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 986 (1968).
114 Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962). However, the Court in
Russell, quoting from its decision in Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1 (1959),
cautioned that " 'substantial safeguards . . . cannot be eradicated under the guise of
technical departures from the rules.' " 369 U.S. at 763 (quoting from 360 U.S. at 9). Each
modification of an indictment must be carefully considered, and not even minor corrections are always permissible. Compare Capriola v. United States, 61 F.2d 5, 11-12 (7th
Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 671 (1933) (correction of a mere clerical error is permissible) with United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 571-72 (2d
Cir. 1961) (inserting a comma substantially modified the indictment).
11 See notes 81-84 supra and accompanying text.
116See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text.
See 514 F.2d at 806-08.
118231 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Pa. 1964). ASTM and a companion case, Application of
11

Turner & Newall, Ltd., 231 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Pa. 1964), are apparently the only cases
which give the unindicted coconspirator question more than cursory treatment. See
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 688 (1974); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pa., 450 F.2d 199, 200 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'd sub noma. Gelbard v. United
States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
119 The court also relied upon Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), and In re
Report of Grand Jury Proceedings, 479 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1973), to support the propositions that grand jury powers are subject to judicial supervision and that the court could
"expunge unauthorized grand jury action." 514 F.2d at 806-07.
120 231 F. Supp. at 688.
121Id. at 690.
122 The ASTM court did not discuss its authority to expunge portions of an indict-
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The Briggs court argued that the decision represented an "ad hoc
approach" that was apparently satisfactory to the parties under the
circumstances of that case, and it did not read ASTM as precluding
the expungement remedy.1 2 3 It also stated that the timing of the relief offered in ASTM, coming after the Government had presented
its evidence, would not adequately protect persons who are named
as unindicted coconspirators.' 2 4 Since the Briggs court reasoned
that the pretrial relief sought by the appellants was warranted, it
ordered their names expunged from the indictment. 125
ment on a motion from persons who are not made defendants, nor did it conclude that
such a remedy was beyond its power.
123514 F.2d at 807.

124 Id. It rejected the Government's contention that ASTM was distinguishable on
the ground that the motion to expunge was made after the Government had presented
its evidence, as opposed to the pretrial relief sought by the appellants. Id. The court
noted that if it were limited to granting expungement only after trial, the remedy would
be "a poor one" at best, since relief, if granted, would come only after the trial had
given greater weight to the accusations and, if denied, the accusations would be given
"added dignity ...by judicial refusal to remove" the names. Id.
125 Id.
at 808. The court found that the remedy was not precluded by either
sovereign or grand jury immunity since the relief requested was of an equitable nature
which would not interfere with the workings of either the Government or the grand
jury. Id.
The court treated the appellants' application "as a petition for a writ of mandamus."
Id. (citing Application of Johnson, 484 F.2d 791, 794-96 (7th Cir.,1973)). The circuit
courts of appeals have the power to issue extraordinary writs, including mandamus, by
virtue of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970). La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352
U.S. 249, 254-60 (1957). See generally 9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
110.28 (2d ed.
1975) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
In Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967), the Supreme Court reviewed the courts
of appeals' powers to issue extraordinary writs. The Court deterined ina' t1_y should
only issue in "exceptional circumstances" when it is necessary to control the court's
jurisdiction or when the district court has engaged in a "judicial 'usurpation of power.' "
Id. at 95-98. Despite the fact that "the opinion bristles with the terms 'extraordinary'
and 'drastic,' " 9 MOORE, supra at 308,
one emerges with the impression that an order to show cause will issue, and
mandamus or its equivalent will be granted, when the court is satisfied that
sound judicial administration so requires and when no other adequate remedy
exists.
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 1570-71.
In Application of Johnson, supra, the Seventh Circuit recognized that since there
were no pending criminal charges against the individuals named in a grand jury report,
the district court's denial of their petition for expungement could not be reached by
appeal. Id. at 794. Inasmuch as the court had previously entertained and denied a petition for mandamus on the grounds that the district court had not abused its discretion,
however, the Seventh Circuit held that it was faced with an unappealable order and let
stand the lower court's dismissal of the application for expungement. Id. at 795, 797.
By treating the "appeal" in Briggs as a petition for a writ of mandamus, the court
was able to avoid the paradox created when a district court denies a petition for expungement made by one who is not a party to the criminal action. However, since the
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While the expungement remedy seems fully warranted by the
facts in Briggs, the court's analysis is somewhat lacking. It seems apparent that any time a court is asked to amend the body of an indictment, the Bain rule would require that it test the proposed amendment for possible prejudice to the defendant. Although in the present
126
case expungement would not appear to prejudice the defendants,
the absence of any noticeable consideration of the impact of expungement is regrettable.
Although the Briggs decision comes close to imposing an absolute ban on naming an individual as an unindicted coconspirator, it
should not be read that broadly. Initially, it should be recognized that
the court's review of the possible governmental interests was, for the
most part, unaided bv the Government. It is possible that a full presentation by the Government might bring to light a substantial reason
for naming persons as unindicted coconspirators. Furthermore, the
court was careful to leave open at least two situations in which a
naming might be proper. First, it noted that a person's voluntary
district court judge apparently denied the initial petition in the erroneous belief that the
petitioners lacked standing, the Fifth Circuit could have achieved its goal in a less
intrusive manner by remanding the case to the district court with an order that it hear
the petitioners on the merits and then exercise its discretion. The clear implication
would be that if the lower court denied the motion to expunge, mandamus would again
lie. Cf. United States v. United States District Court, 238 F.2d 713, 723 (4th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 981 (1957).
126 Adequate notice and the possibility of later jeopardy do not appear to be affected
by the presence or absence of the Briggs appellants' names on the indictment. The
defendants would certainly have adequate notice of the charges against them. In fact,
they also sought expungement of the unindicted coconspirators' names prior to trial, but
relief was denied. Brief for Appellants at 8 n.4, United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794
(5th Cir. 1975). Nor would the possibility of being placed in jeopardy twice arise because of the expungement. Courts look to the substantive offenses that are charged in
determining whether a person is subjected to double jeopardy. See Robbins v. United
States, 476 F.2d 26, 32 (10th Cir. 1973); Bins v. United States, 331 F.2d 390, 393 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964); Hensley v. United States, 160 F.2d 257, 258
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 817 (1947). In determining whether the offenses
charged are the same, federal courts seek to determine whether the facts alleged in one
offense would support a conviction in the other. Robbins v. United States, supra at 32;
Bins v. United States, supra at 393.
There are two basic approaches that are used by the courts in determining whether
two substantive offenses are so similar as to place a defendant twice in jeopardy. Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L. J. 262, 269 (1965). The first is the evidentiary test.
This test basically looks to the evidence necessary to support a conviction. If the evidence for both offenses is the same, the individual is being subjected to double
jeopardy and has a defense. Id. The second approach-a behavioral approach-is concerned more with the defendant's conduct. Id. at 270. Under either test, the defendants
would seem to have an adequate defense if the Government sought to charge them with
a conspiracy which arose out of the same circumstances and which involved one of the
unindicted coconspirators.
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cooperation with a grand jury which resulted in self-incriminating testimony might warrant his being named. 127 Second, it specifically left
open the question of whether a grand jury could be legislatively authorized to name persons as unindicted coconspirators. 12 Finally, it
is important to read the decision in light of its political setting. The
court's reaction to what it suspected was an attempt to use the grand
jury for political purposes gives an underlying coloration to the entire
29
opinion. 1
The Briggs decision does, however, represent authority for denouncing the practice of accusing persons and yet denying them a
forum in which to respond. As such, it is difficult to disagree with the
court's decision.
Thomas W. Polaski
127514 F.2d at 804 n.16. A substantial governmental interest would apparently at-

tach whenever an alleged conspirator has been granted immunity to elicit his testimony.
This interest does not, however, appear to meet the substantial interest test. See note
103 supra.
128514 F.2d at 806.
129 It is quite likely that the Government's inability to present any substantial in-

terests to support the naming of the appellants was because its only interest was "to
chill [the] expressions and associations" of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Id. at
805-06. For the viewpoint that grand juries have always been used for political purposes see Schwartz, supra note 41.

EDITORIAL NOTE
As this Note went to press, the United States Supreme Court issued a uecision
which may well affect the Briggs court's due process analysis. In Paul v. Davis, 44
U.S.L.W. 4387 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976), the plaintiff had been publicized as an "active
shoplifter" by local police although he had never been convicted of shoplifting. The
Court held that he had no cause of action against police officials under the federal civil
rights acts. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, distinguished Joint Anti-Fascist,
Jenkins, and Constantineau, arguing that
this line of cases does not establish the proposition that reputation alone, apart
from some more tangible interests such as employment, is either "liberty" or
"property" by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due
Process Clause.
Id. at 4340. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and White, dissented, claiming that the governmental officials here had branded the plaintiff with the stigma of a
criminal conviction while bypassing constitutional criminal safeguards. Id. at 4345.
Whatever the effect of this decision on the due process issues in Briggs might be, it
would not in any event affect the Briggs court's holding that the grand jury had exceeded its powers.

